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LOCKING THEM UP AND THROWING AWAY THEIR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: THE COURT'S DECISION
IN BEARD V. BANKS DEPRIVED PRISONERS OF
FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
[C]onvicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by
reason of their conviction and confinement in prison.1
INTRODUCTION
As the old saying goes, "lock them up and throw away the key."
When analyzing prison regulations, the U.S. Supreme Court has
largely deferred to prison officials' judgment, holding that prison reg-
ulations are permissible if they are "reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests."' 2 In Beard v. Banks, the Court gave great def-
erence to prison officials when it upheld a prison restriction prohibit-
ing access to newspapers, magazines, and personal photographs.3 The
Court reasoned that the penological interest of inmate rehabilitation
justified the restrictive regulation.4
Imprisonment does not, however, entirely strip prisoners of their
constitutional rights.5 This Note examines the reasoning behind the
Court's decision to defer to prison officials in Beard and how the case
may affect prisoners' rights. While it might sometimes be wise for the
Court to defer to prison officials to a degree, complete deference is
improper-it cannot simply throw away the key. The regulation at
issue in Beard was not reasonably related to a legitimate penological
interest. Thus, it inappropriately deprived prisoners of their First
Amendment rights. 6
Part II briefly surveys previous cases in which the Court tackled
issues concerning prisoners' First Amendment rights.7 As Part II illus-
1. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979).
2. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
3. 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006).
4. Id. at 2579-80.
5. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 545.
6. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states the following: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7. See infra notes 13-117.
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trates, the Court has become increasingly deferential to the judgment
of prison officials. 8 Part III provides the factual and procedural his-
tory of Beard v. Banks, as well as its plurality, concurring, and dissent-
ing opinions.9 Part IV analyzes the Court's failure to properly apply
legal precedent.10 Additionally, it advocates the use of a more appro-
priate analytical framework for examining prison regulations that im-
pinge upon constitutional rights." Finally, Part V explores Beard's
potential impact upon prisons and prisoners, 12 arguing that it will
serve as a justification for future abuses against prisoners by prison
officials.
II. BACKGROUND
A host of U.S. Supreme Court cases have examined prison regula-
tions concerning the constitutional rights of prisoners.13 With the ex-
ception of racial classifications, over the past three decades, when
determining the constitutionality of prison regulations impinging upon
prisoners' constitutional rights, the Court has given increasing defer-
ence to the views of prison officials. 14
8. Compare Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (holding that a prison regulation cen-
soring inmate mail was too broad and was unnecessary to further an important government
interest), with Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (holding that a prison's correspondence regu-
lation was reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest, but that a marriage restriction
was not), and Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989) (upholding a regulation restricting
prisoners from receiving dangerous publications). However, the Court did not extend this level
of deference when analyzing a prison regulation creating racial classifications. Johnson v. Cali-
fornia, 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
9. See infra notes 118-220 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 221-313 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 295-313 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 314-333 and accompanying text.
13. See generally Johnson, 543 U.S. 499 (determining that strict scrutiny analysis was necessary
for prison rules based on racial classifications); see also Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 136
(2003) (finding visitation restrictions valid); Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 225 (2001) (conclud-
ing that prisoners did not have a First Amendment right to give other prisoners legal advice);
Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 404-05 (upholding a rule that restricted prisoner access to publications
that could cause inmate violence); Turner, 482 U.S. at 91 (holding that a regulation restricting
marriage was invalid, but upholding a rule that prohibited correspondence between inmates of
different institutions); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 589 (1984) (upholding a rule prohibit-
ing contact visitation); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 551 (1979) ("[R]estriction on receipt of
hardback books does not infringe the First Amendment rights of ... inmates .... "); Jones v.
N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 121 (1977) (finding that prison regulations ham-
pering the operation of a prisoner labor union were reasonable); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817,
819, 828 (1974) (upholding a prison regulation that restricted media interviews with prisoners);
Martinez, 416 U.S. at 398 (finding a restriction of inmate correspondence to be invalid).
14. See supra note 8.
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A. When Determining the Validity of Prison Regulations that
Impinge upon Constitutional Rights, the Court Largely
Defers to Prison Officials
Prisoners do not enjoy the full rights of free citizens. Yet "[t]here is
no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this
country. 15 Thus, the Court has attempted, and at times struggled, to
establish the manner in which prison regulations restricting constitu-
tional rights should be analyzed.
1. Procunier v. Martinez
In 1974, in Procunier v. Martinez, the Court considered the appro-
priate standard of review for prison regulations restricting prisoners'
exercise of free speech.16 This was the Court's "first significant deci-
sion regarding First Amendment rights in the prison context. 117 In
Martinez, the prison regulation at issue allowed inmate mail to be cen-
sored."' Specifically, inmates could not "unduly complain" or "mag-
nify grievances" in their letters. 19 Additionally, inmate writing was
defined as "contraband" if it expressed "inflammatory political, racial,
religious or other views or beliefs." °20 Finally, prisoners could not send
or receive letters that referred to criminal activity or were "lewd, ob-
scene, or defamatory" or "otherwise inappropriate."'2 1 Prison employ-
ees examined all mail, incoming and outgoing, for infringement of
these rules.22 In its opinion, the Court affirmed the district court rul-
ing, which held that these regulations violated the First Amendment,
because the regulations "authorized censorship of protected expres-
sion without adequate justification. '2 3 While recognizing that courts
should often give deference to the judgment of prison officials, the
Court also asserted that, "[w]hen a prison regulation or practice of-
15. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
16. 416 U.S. at 406.
17. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 408. While this was the first major case in this area, in Martinez
the Court acknowledged that federal courts traditionally used a hands-off approach when faced
with prison problems. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 404.
18. 416 U.S. at 399.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 399-400.
22. Id. at 400. If a violation was discovered, the prison employee could do one of the follow-
ing: return the letter to the inmate; report the violation, which could result in the temporary loss
of the prisoner's mail privileges; or put the letter in the prisoner's file, so it could be referenced
when considering the prisoner's housing, employment, or parole eligibility. Id.
23. Id. at 400-15.
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fends a fundamental constitutional guarantee," courts must fulfill
"their duty to protect constitutional rights. 24
As a preliminary matter, the Martinez Court indicated that the reg-
ulation also implicated the First Amendment rights of free citizens
who correspond with prisoners through letters. 25 Consequently, the
Court refused "any attempt to justify censorship of inmate correspon-
dence merely by reference to certain assumptions about the legal sta-
tus of prisoners. '26
The Court then conducted a two-part analysis to determine the con-
stitutionality of the censorship. First, the regulation "must further an
important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the sup-
pression of expression. ' 27 The Court found that the prison officials
failed to demonstrate that the restrictions were necessary to further a
governmental interest.28  Also, when enforcing these regulations,
there was a risk that the prison employees would "apply their own
personal prejudices and opinions as standards for prisoner mail cen-
sorship." 29 Second, First Amendment rights cannot be limited more
"than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular gov-
ernmental interest involved. ' 30 The Court found that the regulations
were too broad, because they encompassed writings that were not es-
sential to the interest in prison safety and security. 31 In sum, the
Court found that the First Amendment interest in uncensored com-
munication "is protected from arbitrary government invasion. '32
2. Bell v. Wolfish
Five years after Martinez, the Court decided Bell v. Wolfish. 33 In
Bell, the Metropolitan Correctional Center, which primarily housed
pretrial detainees,34 prohibited inmates from receiving hardcover
books unless they were mailed directly from a publisher or book-
24. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 405-06.
25. Id. at 409. For example, "[tihe wife of a prison inmate who is not permitted to read all
that her husband wanted to say to her has suffered an abridgment of her interest in communicat-
ing with him as plain as that which results from censorship of her letter to him." Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 413. In this context, substantial governmental interests include security, order, and
rehabilitation. Id.
28. Id. at 415.
29. Id.
30. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413.
31. Id. at 416.
32. Id. at 418.
33. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
34. Id. at 523.
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store. 35 The warden justified the rule by stating that hardcover books
created a "serious" security concern and each book would have to be
thoroughly inspected for hidden contraband. 36
The Bell Court found that this regulation was constitutional. 37 As a
preliminary matter, the Court outlined four principles regarding pris-
oner rights. First, inmates do not surrender all of their constitutional
rights as a result of their status as prisoners. 38 Second, even though
prisoners retain constitutional rights, these rights may be subject to
limitations that correspond with the "legitimate goals and policies" of
prisons.39 Third, the "legitimate goals and policies" that might justify
limiting prisoners' rights include prison safety and order.40 Fourth,
courts should give wide deference to prison officials unless it is appar-
ent that the regulations are an exaggerated response to the prison's
need for internal safety and order.4'
Further, the Bell Court reasoned that the regulation did not violate
the First Amendment, because it was a "rational response" to "an ob-
vious security problem. '42 The Court emphasized three additional
factors that also influenced its decision.43 First, the regulation was
neutral, because it applied to all books regardless of content.4 4 Sec-
ond, the prisoners had "alternative means" to acquire books and read-
ing materials.4 5 Third, because the inmates were mainly pretrial
detainees, they were only subject to the rule for a maximum of sixty
35. Id. at 550.
36. Id. at 549. The warden explained that "prison officials would have to remove the covers of
hardback books and to leaf through every page of all books and magazines to ensure that drugs,
money, weapons, or other contraband were not secreted in the material." Id. On the other
hand, the warden noted that "there is relatively little risk that material received directly from a
publisher or book club would contain contraband, and therefore, the security problems are sig-
nificantly reduced without a drastic strain on resources." Id.
37. Id. at 549-50. The appellate court found the regulation to be unconstitutional, stating that
"it is obvious that many books sought by inmates are available neither in the library nor directly
from a publisher. And it is inconceivable that the first amendment rights of an incarcerated
individual do not extend beyond a few, selected titles." Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 130 (2d
Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
38. Bell, 441 U.S. at 545.
39. Id. at 546.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 547-48.
42. Id. at 550.
43. Id. at 551.
44. Bell, 441 U.S. at 551.
45. Id. While the appellate court portrayed the inmate's book selection as limited to mere
"selected titles," the Court noted that inmates could receive paperback books and magazines
from any source, they could use the institution's library which contained 3,000 hardcover books
and 5,000 paperback books, or they could buy various newspapers and magazines. Id. at 552
n.33.
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days.46 In light of these considerations, the Court determined that the
regulation was reasonable. 47
3. Turner v. Safley
Next, in 1987, in Turner v. Safley,48 the Court established that a def-
erential standard of scrutiny is appropriate when determining the con-
stitutionality of prison regulations infringing upon prisoners'
constitutional rights.49  Two regulations were at issue in Turner.
50
First, the prison prohibited correspondence between inmates housed
in different prisons.51 The second regulation permitted inmates to
marry only when the prison superintendent had "compelling reasons"
to grant permission to marry.52 The Court held that the correspon-
dence regulation was constitutional, but the marriage restriction was
not.
53
In making this determination, the Court first established the stan-
dard of review.54 It reasoned that Martinez failed to establish a level
of review, because the case focused on the prison regulation's conse-
quential restriction on the rights of non-prisoners. 55 The Court noted
that Bell had already used a reasonableness standard of review, but, to
avoid confusion, it would now clarify that standard. 56 Thus, the Court
determined that, "when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' con-
stitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests. '57
46. Id. at 552.
47. Id.
48. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
49. Id. at 81.
50. Id.
51. Id. However, the rule provided an exception for correspondence with immediate family
members who were also incarcerated and for communication involving legal matters. Id.
52. Id. at 82. "Compelling reasons" typically included only pregnancy or birth of a child out
of wedlock. Id.
53. Id. at 91.
54. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
55. Id. at 85 (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974)).
56. The Court also noted three other post-Martinez cases that used a rational basis standard
when reviewing prison regulations. Id. at 86-88. First, in Pell v. Procunier, the Court upheld a
regulation that restricted the media from interviewing individual prisoners. 417 U.S. 817, 819,
835 (1974). Second, in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, the Court rejected a challenge
to a regulation restricting the activities of a prison labor union. 433 U.S. 119, 121 (1977). Finally,
in Block v. Rutherford, the Court upheld a restriction that banned contact visits. 468 U.S. 576,
586-88 (1984).
57. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. The Court explained that using a strict scrutiny analysis would
hinder a prison official's "ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solu-
tions to the intractable problems of prison administration." Id.
[Vol. 57:793
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Further, the Turner Court delineated four factors for determining
the reasonableness of prison rules.58 First, "there must be a valid, ra-
tional connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate
governmental interest put forward to justify it." 59 This connection
cannot be "so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational.
60
Additionally, when a regulation implicates First Amendment rights, it
should be "operated in a neutral fashion, without regard to the con-
tent of the expression. '61 The second factor "is whether there are al-
ternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison
inmates. '62 Third, courts should give significant deference to prison
officials where accommodating the constitutional right would have a
negative "ripple effect" on other inmates and prison employees. 63
Fourth, "easy alternatives" that could accommodate prisoners' rights
"may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable, but is an 'ex-
aggerated response' to the prison concerns. '64
In Turner, the Court found that the correspondence regulation was
reasonably related to the legitimate penological interest in prison
safety. 65 Otherwise, inmates could communicate escape plans, violent
acts, or other criminal activities. 66 This regulation addressed the legit-
imate concern of inmate safety. Additionally, it only prohibited corre-
spondence with other inmates, not with free citizens. Finally, there
were no easy alternatives to the restriction that could address these
safety concerns. 67 Thus, in applying the four-part test, the regulation
was facially valid.68
In contrast, the marriage regulation did not meet the reasonable-
ness standard.69 The fundamental right to marry is not inconsistent
with the status of prisoners. 70 Moreover, the regulation was not rea-
58. Id. at 89-90.
59. Id. at 89 (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. Id. at 89-90.
61. Id. at 90.
62. Id.
63. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 91.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 91-92. The only alternative, having prison employees inspect each piece of corre-
spondence, would impose too large of a burden. Id.
68. Id. at 99.
69. Turner, 482 U.S. at 97.
70. Id. at 95-96. The Court emphasized four important attributes of marriage that retain rele-
vance for inmates: marriage is an expression "of emotional support and public commitment";
marriage may have religious significance; most marriages will continue when the inmate is re-
leased or paroled; and marriage "often is a precondition to the receipt of government benefits."
Id.
2008] 799
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sonably related to safety concerns. 71 Prison officials were concerned
that allowing marriage could create "love triangles" involving multiple
prisoners, causing inmate rivalries and violence. 72 However, this was
not a legitimate justification, because love triangles could also develop
within nonmarital relationships. 73 Additionally, prison officials ar-
gued that female prisoners should be rehabilitated by developing self-
reliance skills rather than being dependent upon and marrying males,
but this was not legitimate, because it was paternalistic and overly
broad.74 Thus, the marriage regulation failed the Court's deferential,
reasonableness test.75
4. Thornburgh v. Abbott
The Court has since applied Turner's four-part test when determin-
ing the constitutionality of prison regulations infringing upon constitu-
tional rights.76 Thornburgh v. Abbott involved a challenge to a prison
regulation allowing prison officials to prevent inmates from obtaining
any mailed publications deemed "detrimental to institutional secur-
ity."' 77 The prison officials examined each individual issue of the pub-
lications to determine whether they would be harmful to security. 78
Officials were not permitted to deny a publication to a prisoner
"solely because its content is religious, philosophical, political, social
or sexual, or because its content is unpopular or repugnant. ' 79 Addi-
tionally, the warden was required to give notice to the prisoner and
71. Id. at 97.
72. Id. at 97-98.
73. Id. at 98.
74. Id. at 97-99. The prison officials argued "that female prisoners often were subject to
abuse at home or were overly dependent on male figures, and that this dependence or abuse was
connected to the crimes they had committed." Id. at 97.
75. Turner, 482 U.S. at 99.
76. See, e.g., Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401
(1989); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
77. 490 U.S. at 403.
78. Id. at 405.
79. Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 540.71(b) (1988)). A prison warden could, however, prevent an
inmate from receiving a publication for the following reasons:
(1) It depicts or describes procedures for the construction or use of weapons, ammuni-
tion, bombs or incendiary devices;
(2) It depicts, encourages, or describes methods of escape from correctional facilities,
or contains blueprints, drawings or similar descriptions of Bureau of Prisons
institutions;
(3) It depicts or describes procedures for the brewing of alcoholic beverages, or the
manufacture of drugs;
(4) It is written in code;
(5) It depicts, describes or encourages activities which may lead to the use of physical
violence or group disruption;
(6) It encourages or instructs in the commission of criminal activity;
2008] BEARD V. BANKS 801
the sender of the publication, indicating why the prison denied the
prisoner access to the publication.80
The Court determined that the Turner test should be applied. 81 In
doing so, the Court overruled Martinez,8 2 which used a higher stan-
dard of review regarding a regulation pertaining to outgoing corre-
spondence with free citizens.8 3 The Court found that the regulation at
issue in Thornburgh met Turner's four-part reasonableness standard.8 4
First, the Court reasoned that the regulation was rationally related to
a legitimate and neutral government objective. 5 For example, some
publications, once circulated among the prisoners, could potentially
induce disruptive behavior.8 6 The rule was also neutral, because offi-
cials "draw distinctions between publications solely on the basis of
their potential implications for prison security."8 7 Thus, the rule ra-
tionally prohibited publications that the warden determined would
create an "intolerable risk of disorder" within the prison.88 Second,
the regulation allowed sufficient alternative means for prisoners to ex-
ercise their First Amendment rights at issue, because they were al-
lowed to receive a wide array of publications.8 9 Third, allowing select
publications into the prison could negatively affect the safety and se-
(7) It is sexually explicit material which by its nature or content poses a threat to the
security, good order, or discipline of the institution, or facilitates criminal activity.
Id. at 405 n.5.
80. Id. at 406. The inmate was also permitted to appeal the warden's decision to reject the
publication. Id.
81. Id. at 419.
82. Id. at 413-14.
83. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 415-17 (1974). The Court could have upheld Marti-
nez, while still applying the rational basis test to regulations concerning incoming correspon-
dence. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 413-14. However, the Court stated that it would rather overrule
Martinez than apply different standards of review for incoming and outgoing mail. Id. The
Court explained as follows:
[W]e recognize that it might have been possible to apply a reasonableness standard to
all incoming materials without overruling Martinez: we instead could have made clear
that Martinez does not uniformly require the application of a "least restrictive alterna-
tive" analysis. We choose not to go that route, however, for we prefer the express
flexibility of the Turner reasonableness standard. We adopt the Turner standard in this
case with confidence that, as petitioners here have asserted, "a reasonableness standard
is not toothless."
Id.
84. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 419.
85. Id. at 414.
86. Id. at 412. For example, "prisoners may observe particular material in the possession of a
fellow prisoner, draw inferences about their fellow's beliefs, sexual orientation, or gang affilia-
tions from that material, and cause disorder by acting accordingly." Id.
87. Id. at 415.
88. Id. at 417.
89. Id. at 418.
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curity of other inmates and prison employees. 90 Finally, on its face,
the regulation was "not an exaggerated response" to the safety con-
cern.91 Thus, the Court found that the prison regulation was valid.92
5. Overton v. Bazzetta
In 2003, the Court again applied Turner's reasonableness standard
to analyze a prison regulation. 93 Overton v. Bazzetta involved a chal-
lenge to a prison's visitation policies.94 Due to limited resources, the
prison had trouble adequately supervising the prisoners' visitation ses-
sions, and, consequently, officials encountered difficulty controlling
drug smuggling into the prison.95 In response, the prison forbade in-
mates with multiple substance abuse infractions from having visitors
other than clergy members and attorneys, and it required these in-
mates to wait two years before reapplying for full visitation
privileges. 96
The Court held that the regulation was valid, because it met Tur-
ner's four-part test.97 First, the restriction was rationally related to the
legitimate goal of "deterring the use of drugs and alcohol within the
prisons," particularly for those inmates "who have few other privi-
leges to lose."98 However, the Court noted that, had this been "a de
facto permanent ban on all visitation for certain inmates, [it] might
reach a different conclusion in a challenge to a particular application
of the regulation." 99 Second, the prisoners had alternative means of
communicating with prohibited visitors. 10 0 For example, the inmates
90. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 418. In other words, the regulation prevents the "ripple effect."
Id.; accord Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
91. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 418 (internal quotation marks omitted). The prison officials also
noted that simply tearing out the objectionable portions of a publication before giving it to an
inmate could potentially cause even more discontent. Id. The Court responded that "when
prison officials are able to demonstrate that they have rejected a less restrictive alternative be-
cause of reasonably founded fears that it will lead to greater harm, they succeed in demonstrat-
ing that the alternative they in fact select was not an 'exaggerated response' under Turner." Id.
at 419.
92. Id. at 419.
93. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003).
94. Id. at 128.
95. Id. at 129.
96. Id. at 130. Additionally, the prison officials sought to reduce the number of visitors by
limiting visitation for all prisoners to immediate family, ten individuals designated by the pris-
oner, and clergy members and attorneys. Id. at 129. They also prohibited former inmates, other
than immediate family members, and minors, other than a prisoner's child, stepchild, grandchild,
or sibling, from visiting. Id. at 129-30.
97. Id. at 131.
98. Id. at 134.
99. Overton, 539 U.S. at 134.
100. Id. at 135.
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could write letters and make telephone calls.' 0 ' The Court observed
that "[a]lternatives to visitation need not be ideal, however; they need
only be available." 10 2 Third, allowing inmates with substance abuse
violations to have full visitation privileges would impact other inmates
and prison employees, because it would reduce prison officials' ability
to "protect all who are inside a prison's walls."10 3 Fourth, reducing
the severity of the visitation restriction for substance abuse violators
would not be a ready alternative, because it would undermine the reg-
ulation's goals. 10 4 Thus, the Court upheld the regulation. 10 5
B. The Court Made a Narrow Exception to the Typical Turner
Analysis for Regulations Involving Racial Classifications
Although the Court seemed to consistently apply the Turner test
when reviewing the validity of prison regulations, it refused to extend
its application to prison policies involving racial classifications. 10 6 In
Johnson v. California, an unwritten prison policy provided for the ra-
cial segregation of prisoners.' 07 All new and transferred inmates
within the California Department of Corrections were housed with an
inmate of the same race while awaiting permanent placement.108
Prison officials stressed that this housing practice was "necessary to
prevent violence caused by gangs." 10 9 In evaluating this policy, the
Ninth Circuit applied the Turner test and concluded that the practice
was valid. °10 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the pol-
icy must be reviewed under strict scrutiny."'
The Court reasoned that strict scrutiny must be applied to racial
classifications,' 1 2 even where the policy affected all races equally.11 3
In fact, the Court noted that this type of policy could exacerbate racial
bias and violence."t 4 Allowing anything but a strict scrutiny analysis
101. Id.
102. Id. "Were it shown that no alternative means of communication existed, though it would
not be conclusive, it would be some evidence that the regulations were unreasonable." Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 136.
105. Overton, 539 U.S. at 131.
106. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
107. Id. at 502.
108. Id. This preliminary housing could last up to sixty days. Id.
109. Id. Prison officials named five major gangs within the California Department of Correc-
tions: Mexican Mafia, Nuestra Familia, Black Guerilla Family, Aryan Brotherhood, and Nazi
Low Riders. Id.
110. Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791,799, 807 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
111. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 509.
112. Id. at 505.
113. Id. at 506; see Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954).
114. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 507.
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"would undermine our 'unceasing efforts to eradicate racial prejudice
from our criminal justice system.' ' 1 5 Thus, the Turner standard was
"too lenient" and "would allow prison officials to use race-based poli-
cies even when there are race-neutral means to accomplish the same
goal, and even when the race-based policy does not in practice ad-
vance that goal."116 Therefore, the Court rejected the Turner standard
in the narrow context of racially based regulations. 1 7 In short, with
the exception of racial classifications, the Court has increasingly de-
ferred to prison officials when determining the constitutionality of
prison regulations.
III. SUBJECT OPINION: BEARD V. BANKS
In Beard v. Banks, the Court examined yet another prison regula-
tion.118 A divided Court used the Turner factors to uphold a prison
regulation prohibiting inmate access to newspapers, magazines, and
personal photographs. 119 Justices Roberts, Kennedy, and Souter
joined Justice Breyer's plurality opinion.1 20 Justice Scalia joined Jus-
tice Thomas's concurring opinion.121 Justices Stevens and Ginsburg
both dissented. 122
A. Factual History
Pennsylvania's Department of Corrections operates special units for
the state's most difficult prisoners.123 Pennsylvania's Long Term Seg-
regation Unit (LTSU) is the most restrictive unit and contains the
"most incorrigible, recalcitrant inmates.1 124 Approximately forty pris-
115. Id. at 512 (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 (1987)).
116. Id. at 513.
117. Id.
118. 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006).
119. Id. at 2576.
120. Id. at 2575.
121. Id. at 2582.
122. Id. at 2585, 2591. Eight Justices participated in the consideration of this case; Justice
Alito did not take part. Id. at 2575.
123. Id. at 2576.
124. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2576. Prisoners in the LTSU included those who exhibited violent
and assaultive behavior toward other prisoners and prison employees, participated in prison
gangs, acted as sexual predators, or attempted escape from prison. Specifically, all prisoners in
the LTSU had to meet at least one of the following conditions: failure to complete the Special
Management Unit program; exhibiting "assaultive behavior with the intent to cause death or
serious bodily injury"; injuring other prisoners or prison staff; "engaging in facility distur-
bances(s)"; belonging to a prison gang; partaking in criminal activity; possessing weapons or
"implements of escape"; having "a history of 'serious' escape attempts"; "exerting negative influ-
ence in facility activities": or being a "sexual predator." Id.
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oners live within one of the LTSU's two levels.1 25 These prisoners are
generally locked in their cells for twenty-three hours each day.
126
Each LTSU prisoner spends at least ninety days in level 2, the most
restrictive level.127 Then, "depending on an inmate's behavior," he
can potentially "graduate" to level 1, which is less restrictive. 128 But,
in reality, most do not make the transition.129 Within level 2, prison-
ers "have no access to the commissary, they may have only one visitor
per month (an immediate family member), and they are not allowed
phone calls except in emergencies. ' 130
At issue in Beard was a restriction prohibiting LTSU level 2 inmates
"access to newspapers, magazines, or personal photographs. ' 131 Level
2 prisoners are the only inmates in Pennsylvania subject to this restric-
tion.1 32 However, level 2 inmates are allowed to have "legal and per-
sonal correspondence, religious and legal materials, two library books,
and writing paper. '13 3 If a level 2 inmate graduates to level 1, he is
then permitted to have one newspaper and five magazines.
134
B. Procedural History
Ronald Banks, on behalf of himself and other inmates housed in
LTSU's level 2, filed an action against Jeffrey Beard, the Secretary of
Pennsylvania's Department of Corrections ("Secretary"), in federal
court. 135 Banks alleged that the prison regulation prohibiting level 2
inmates from having access to newspapers, magazines, and personal
photographs violated the First Amendment, because the rule had "no
reasonable relation to any legitimate penological objective.' 1 36 The
district court granted the Secretary's motion for summary judg-
ment.137 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court, holding that the restriction "cannot be supported as a matter of
125. ld.
126. Id. at 2576.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2575.
129. Id.
130. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2576.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. However, the photograph restriction applies to both levels 2 and 1 of the LTSU. Id.
at 2576-77.
135. Id. at 2577.
136. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2577.
137. Id.
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law by the record in this case."' 138 The U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 139
C. Justice Breyer's Plurality Opinion
The Court reversed the Third Circuit's decision and held that the
Secretary provided sufficient support for the prison regulation. 140 It
acknowledged that "imprisonment does not automatically deprive a
prisoner of certain important constitutional protections, including
those of the First Amendment. ' 141 However, it also stated that "the
Constitution sometimes permits greater restriction of such rights in
prison than it would allow elsewhere."'1 42 As a result, the Court found
that it must give "substantial deference to the professional judgment
of prison administrators"'' 43 and should uphold restrictive regulations
that are "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."'1 44
In support of his motion for summary judgment, the Secretary of-
fered three "penological rationales" for the prison policy:
(1) to "motivat[e]" better "behavior" on the part of these "particu-
larly difficult prisoners," by providing them with an incentive to
move to level 1, or out of the LTSU altogether, and to "discour-
age backsliding" on the part of level 1 inmates;
(2) to minimize the amount of property controlled by the prisoners,
on the theory that the "less property these high maintenance,
high supervision, obdurate troublemakers have, the easier it is
for ...correctional officer[s] to detect concealed contraband
[and] to provide security"; and
(3) to diminish the amount of material (in particular newspapers
and magazines) that prisoners might use as weapons of attack in
the form of "'spears"' or "'blow guns,"' or that they could em-
ploy "as tools to catapult feces at the guards without the neces-
sity of soiling one's own hands," or use "as tinder for cell
fires."145
The Court found that the first rationale, improving inmate behavior,
alone justified the prison restriction and satisfied the Turner test. 46
The Court summarized Turner's factors as follows: (1) whether there
is a "'valid, rational connection' between the prison regulation and
138. Id. (quoting Banks v. Beard, 399 F.3d 134. 148 (3d Cir. 2005)). Specifically, the Third
Circuit found that the regulation failed Turner's four-part test. Banks, 399 F.3d at 148.
139. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2577.
140. Id. at 2582.
141. Id. at 2577.
142. Id. at 2577-78.
143. Id. at 2578 (quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003)).
144. Id. (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87 (1987)).
145. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2579.
146. Id.
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the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it"; (2)
whether there are "alternative means of exercising the right that re-
main open to prison inmates"; (3) what type of impact the "accommo-
dation of the asserted constitutional right" will have "on guards and
other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally";
and (4) whether there are "'ready alternatives' for furthering the gov-
ernmental interest. " 147
As for Turner's first factor, the Court found that the restriction was
logically connected to the legitimate penological objective of improv-
ing inmate behavior, because the restriction provided an incentive for
the inmates to improve their behavior in order to regain their privi-
leges. 148 Regarding the second factor, the Court acknowledged that
there were no other means for level 2 inmates to access newspapers,
magazines, or photographs. 49 Although the prisoners would be able
to regain this right after graduating to level 1, the Court admitted that,
in "approximately 21h years after the LTSU opened, about 25 percent
of those confined to level 2 did graduate to level 1 or out of the LTSU
altogether.' 150 However, the Court justified this circumstance by ex-
plaining that the lack of alternative means is "'some evidence that the
regulations [a]re unreasonable,' but is not 'conclusive' of the reasona-
bleness of the Policy.' 151
Furthermore, the Court found that the impact of accommodating
the right, as addressed in Turner's third factor, would be "negative,"
because, if the rule results in improved behavior, the absence of the
rule would cause "worse behavior." 5 2 Finally, concerning the fourth
factor, there was no "ready alternative" to accommodate the right
without jeopardizing the penological interest of providing an incentive
for improved behavior.1 53
In light of these factors, the Court found that the restriction was
reasonable. 54 In support of its decision, the Court noted that, in
Overton, it had held that withholding privileges "is a proper and even
necessary management technique to induce compliance with the rules
of inmate behavior, especially for high-security prisoners who have
few other privileges to lose."'1 55 Here, as in Overton, the prison offi-
147. Id. at 2578 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90).
148. Id. at 2579.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2580 (quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 135 (2003)).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2580.
155. Id. (quoting Overton, 539 U.S. at 134).
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cials used their professional judgment to determine that the restriction
would help to induce better inmate behavior. 156
Banks argued that the regulation was "unreasonable as a matter of
law," because it did not provide a significant incentive for level 2 in-
mates to improve behavior. 157 Banks supported his assertion with va-
rious lower court decisions finding that "increased contact with the
world generally favors rehabilitation. ' 158 The Court rejected his argu-
ment, distinguishing the cases upon which he relied, because they did
not deal with particularly difficult prisoners, such as those in level 2.159
Finally, the Court stated that the Ninth Circuit gave "too little def-
erence to the judgment of prison officials. ' 160 However, the Court
added a caveat: "we do not suggest that the deference owed to prison
authorities makes it impossible for prisoners or others attacking a
prison policy like the present one ever to succeed or to survive sum-
mary judgment. ' 161 In other words, the relationship between a prison
regulation and a penological objective cannot merely be a "formalistic
logical connection." 162 The Court noted that, if the regulation had
been a "de facto permanent ban," it may have reached a "different
conclusion."'1 63
D. Justice Thomas's Concurrence
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas asserted that the regulation
should not have been analyzed under the Turner factors. 164 Rather,
he concluded that the rule was constitutional under the approach that
he outlined in his Overton concurrence.1 65 Justice Thomas criticized
156. Id. at 2581.
157. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2581. Banks argued that the regulation would not be an incentive,
"given the history of incorrigibility of the inmates concerned." Id.
158. Id. For example, Banks pointed to Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015 (2d Cir. 1985);
Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445 (3d Cir. 1995); and Knecht v. Collins, 903 F. Supp. 1193 (S.D. Ohio
1995).
159. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2581.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2582.
164. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
165. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2582 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Scalia also joined Justice
Thomas's concurrence in Overton. See Overton, 539 U.S. at 138 (Thomas, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Thomas stated that, contrary to the presumptions in Turner, the Constitution does not con-
tain an "implicit definition of incarceration." Beard, 126 S. Ct. 2582 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(quoting Overton, 539 U.S. at 139). Rather, "[s]tates are free to define and redefine all types of
punishment, including imprisonment, to encompass various types of deprivations-provided
only that those deprivations are consistent with the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 2582-83 (emphasis
in original) (quoting Overton, 539 U.S. at 139). Thus, because states have the power to deter-
mine the conditions of imprisonment, states may also decide that a punishment can include the
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the shortcomings of the Turner test. 166 He stressed that, even if a reg-
ulation is related to a legitimate penological interest, the Turner test is
inappropriate when "applied to prison regulations that seek to modify
inmate behavior through privilege deprivation.' 67 By definition,
prison regulations that remove privileges in an attempt to induce bet-
ter prisoner behavior must fail Turner's second factor, which looks to
whether the prisoner has other means to exercise the restricted
right. 168 Encouraging good behavior by depriving inmates of a right
would be ineffective if prisoners had alternative means to exercise
that right. 169
Justice Thomas further argued that the third and fourth Turner fac-
tors do not comport with "privilege deprivation policies. ' 170 The third
factor, which looks to how the restriction impacts other inmates and
guards, is irrelevant in analyzing a regulation that encourages good
behavior.' 7' Additionally, the fourth factor, whether there are "ready
alternatives" to accommodate the restricted right, is not a suitable
consideration in determining the regulation's validity, "because the
unavailability of 'ready alternatives' is typically.., one of the underly-
ing rationales for the adoption of inmate privilege deprivation poli-
cies. ' 172  Thus, Justice Thomas concurred with the plurality's
judgment but stressed that the regulation should not have been ana-
lyzed under the Turner test.173
E. Justice Stevens's Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the prison officials failed
to establish that the regulation was reasonably related to any peno-
logical interest. 174 Thus, he believed that the Ninth Circuit correctly
rejected the prison officials' request for summary judgment. 175 Justice
Stevens explained that prisoners retain their First Amendment rights,
and a regulation that invades these rights is invalid unless "reasonably
deprivation of a constitutional right, so long as the prison officials "are not acting ultra vires with
respect to the discretion given them." Id. at 2583 (quoting Overton, 539 U.S. at 140). Thus,
Justice Thomas argued that the State of Pennsylvania can determine whether or not to allow
prisoners to have newspapers, magazines, and personal photographs. Id.
166. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2584-85 (Thomas, J., concurring).
167. Id. at 2584.
168. Id. at 2584-85 (Thomas, J., concurring); see Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
169. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2585 (Thomas, J., concurring).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 2586 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
175. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2586 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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related to legitimate penological interests.' 76 A regulation cannot be
upheld if the regulation's relation to the penological goal is "so re-
mote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational."1 77 In this case,
the parties agreed that the regulation, which prohibited access to secu-
lar, nonlegal newspapers and magazines and personal photographs,
impinged upon the inmates' First Amendment rights.1 78 Justice Ste-
vens argued that the penological interests asserted by the Secretary
did not justify infringing upon the prisoners' rights. 179
First, Justice Stevens asserted that the Secretary's security rationale
could not justify the regulation.' 80 The inmates are allowed to have a
number of items in their cells, including religious newspapers, legal
periodicals, a library book, Bibles, a prison handbook, ten sheets of
writing paper, envelopes, and carbon paper. 18' Considering all of
these materials allowed in the cells, permitting inmates to also have a
secular, nonlegal newspaper or magazine would not result in "any
measurable effect on the likelihood that inmates will start fires, hide
contraband, or engage in other dangerous actions."'8 2 In fact, in his
deposition, a prison official was unable to point to any distinctly dan-
gerous behaviors that could result from allowing access to magazines,
newspapers, and photographs, because disruptive behaviors could al-
ready be accomplished with the materials currently allowed in the
cells .1 3 For example, the official admitted that the inmates would be
able to start fires and throw feces and urine with the items already
permitted in the cells.18 4 Moreover, in his deposition, the official
never suggested that photographs might be used to fuel fires and
throw excrement.1 8 5 With these facts, Justice Stevens concluded that,
at a minimum, reasonable minds could differ regarding the alleged
connection between the regulation and the prison's security interests;
thus, summary judgment was improper. 8 6
176. Id. at 2585 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
177. Id. (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89).
178. Id. at 2585-86. See also Thornburgh v. Abbott. 490 U.S. 401. 408 (1989) ("[Tihere is no
question that publishers who wish to communicate with those who, through subscription, will-
ingly seek their point of view have a legitimate First Amendment interest in access to prison-
ers."). Photographs are also protected by the First Amendment. Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S.
115, 119 (1973).
179. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2586 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
180. Id.
181. Id. In their cells, prisoners also have a jumpsuit, a blanket, bed sheets, a pillow, toilet
paper, socks, undershorts, and undershirts. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 2587.
184. Id.
185. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2587 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
186. Id.
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Second, in Justice Stevens's view, the Secretary's rehabilitation ra-
tionale was also an insufficient justification for the regulation. 187 The
Secretary argued that the regulation encouraged rehabilitation, be-
cause the inmates in level 2 had an incentive to display good behavior
as a means to be upgraded to level 1 and regain access to newspapers,
magazines, and photographs.'8 8 Justice Stevens pointed out that this
"deprivation theory of rehabilitation" is without limitation, because,
"if sufficient, it would provide a 'rational basis' for any regulation that
deprives a prisoner of a constitutional right so long as there is at least
a theoretical possibility that the prisoner can regain the right at some
future time by modifying his behavior."1 89 Additionally, Justice Ste-
vens asserted that, with the deprivation theory of rehabilitation, "the
more important the constitutional right at stake . . . the stronger the
justification for depriving prisoners of that right."190
Justice Stevens agreed with Justice Thomas's assertion that this the-
ory of rehabilitation does not fit within the Turner test, because it is
impossible to have a "ready alternative" to a deprived right without
compromising the penological interest of inducing better behavior
through the deprivation of that right.1 91 Additionally, Justice Stevens
explained that, under the plurality's reasoning, the marriage regula-
tion that the Court invalidated in Turner would have to be upheld,
because it would give prisoners an incentive to behave well so that
they could be released early from prison and exercise their right to get
married. 192 However, Justice Stevens found this type of reasoning ob-
jectionable, because, if "a reasonable factfinder could conclude that
challenged deprivations have a tenuous logical connection to rehabili-
tation, or are exaggerated responses to a prison's legitimate interest in
rehabilitation, prison officials are not entitled to judgment as a matter
of law."' 193
Furthermore, Justice Stevens doubted the usefulness of the prison
regulation. He reasoned that the regulation did not seem necessary
for prisoner rehabilitation or prison safety, because most state and
federal prisons did not utilize similar bans.194 Additionally, level 2
inmates had many other incentives, other than the prospect of regain-
ing access to newspapers, magazines, and photographs, to exhibit
187. Id. at 2587-90.
188. Id. at 2587.
189. Id. at 2588.
190. Id.
191. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2588 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 2588-89.
194. Id. at 2589.
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good behavior and be moved out of level 2.195 For example, if inmates
were moved to level 1, they could have two visitors each month, make
a phone call each month, use the commissary, and take part in educa-
tional and counseling programs. 196 Moreover, prisoners did not
regain access to personal photographs unless they rejoined the general
prison population. 197 There were many reasons, other than gaining
access to photographs, why prisoners would have an incentive to im-
prove their behavior and be moved to the general prison popula-
tion. 98 For example, in the general prison population, the prisoner
would no longer be in solitary confinement and would have access to
radio and television. 199 As a result, Justice Stevens concluded that a
reasonable trier of fact could find that prisoners had strong incentives,
without the regulation at issue, to exhibit good behavior as a means to
be moved from level 2.200
Further, inmates can potentially remain in level 2 indefinitely. 201 In
fact, in the two years of its operation prior to Beard, 75% of level 2
inmates remained there.20 2 Thus, the deprivation of the inmates' First
Amendment rights could be indefinite. 20 3 Because most inmates re-
mained in level 2 on a long-term basis, Justice Stevens argued that a
reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the regulation was an "ex-
aggerated response to [the prison's] legitimate interest in
rehabilitation. 204
Finally, Justice Stevens commented that the "most troubling" aspect
of the regulation was that it "comes perilously close to a state-spon-
sored effort at mind control. ' 20 5 The regulation "prevents prisoners
from 'receiv[ing] suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral,
and other ideas,' which are central to the development and preserva-
tion of individual identity." 20 6 Also, without personal photographs,
195. Id.
196. Id. Level 2 inmates are in solitary confinement, get one visitor each month, do not get
phone calls other than in emergencies, cannot use the commissary, and may not take part in
education programs. Id.
197. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2589 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 2590. Additionally, the prison officials did not offer any other evidence, such as a
psychological behavior modification theory that could demonstrate the regulation's effective-
ness. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. The Third Circuit described level 2 as an area for long-term segregation. Id. (quoting
Banks v. Beard 399 F.3d 134, 141 (3d Cir. 2005)).
203. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2590 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 2590-91.
205. Id. at 2591.
206. Id. (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)).
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some inmates may be unable to remember their loved ones. 20 7 This
regulation effectively cut off prisoners from society.20 8 For all of these
reasons, Justice Stevens believed that the issue of whether the regula-
tion was reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest should
be resolved through a full trial, not through an award of summary
judgment.20 9
F. Justice Ginsburg's Dissent
Justice Ginsburg wrote a separate dissent in which she emphasized
that the plurality incorrectly viewed summary judgment. 21 0 Summary
judgment was not appropriate, because a rational trier of fact could
have found that the regulation was not "reasonably related to legiti-
mate penological interests."121' Deference should be given to prison
officials only after the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to
the prisoners who are challenging the regulation.212
Justice Ginsburg noted that the Secretary's support for summary
judgment was scarce: "the kind that could be made to justify virtually
any prison regulation that does not involve physical abuse.121 3 A rea-
sonable trier of fact could find that the regulation's connection to the
penological purpose is "so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or
irrational. '214 For example, the inmates were not allowed to have The
Christian Science Monitor but were allowed to have The Jewish Daily
Forward.215 This distinction was based solely on a prison official's de-
cision that The Christian Science Monitor did not qualify as a "relig-
ious publication" but The Jewish Daily Forward did.21 6 Justice
Ginsburg added, "Prisoners are allowed to read Harlequin romance
novels, but not to learn about the war in Iraq or Hurricane Ka-
trina. ' '21 7 Thus, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the justification for
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2591 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 2592 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
211. Id. (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
212. Id. at 2592-93. Before granting summary judgment, a court must consider the following:
[T]he judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors
one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the
[movant] on the evidence presented. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in
support of the [movant's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which
the jury could reasonably find for the [movant].
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
213. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2592 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 2593 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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the regulation was "too tenuous to be plausible. ' 218 Justice Ginsburg
would have reversed the award of summary judgment.219 She asserted
that, by granting summary judgment in this circumstance, "the plural-
ity effectively tells prison officials they will succeed in cases of this
order, and swiftly, while barely trying. 220
IV. ANALYSIS
The regulation in Beard improperly deprived prisoners of their First
Amendment rights. In analyzing the regulation, the Court incorrectly
applied Turner's four-factor test.22 1 The decision in Beard is also dis-
tinguishable from other cases in which the Court upheld prison regu-
lations impinging upon First Amendment rights. 222 Alternatively, the
Court should have adopted a standard that did not further extend the
deference given to prison officials. 223
A. The Beard Court Failed to Properly Apply Turner's First Factor
In Turner, the Court set out a four-part test for determining the
reasonableness of prison regulations.224 When applying the first fac-
tor to Beard's facts, the Court incorrectly found that the prison regula-
tion was rationally related to the legitimate penological interest of
improving inmate behavior. In Turner, the Court asserted that "a reg-
ulation cannot be sustained where the logical connection between the
regulation and the asserted goal is so remote as to render the policy
arbitrary or irrational. '225 If the connection is arbitrary or irrational,
"then the regulation fails, irrespective of whether the other [Turner]
factors tilt in its favor. '226 The regulation prohibiting level 2 prisoners
from having access to secular, nonlegal newspapers and magazines
and personal photographs was both arbitrary and irrational. 227 At
most, there was a mere tenuous relationship between the regulation
and the legitimate interest of improved inmate behavior. 228
218. Id.
219. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2593 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
220. Id.
221. See infra notes 224-265.
222. See infra notes 266-294.
223. See infra notes 295-313.
224. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987).
225. Id. (emphasis added).
226. Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223. 229-230 (2001) (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90).
227. See infra notes 229-247 and accompanying text.
228. See id.
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Prison officials failed to provide any evidence demonstrating that
this specific regulation encourages improved inmate behavior,229 nor
was the connection self-evident. 230 In fact, common sense would hold
that this regulation would have little or no positive impact on inmate
behavior. LTSU's inmates are the "worst of the worst" and the "most
incorrigible, recalcitrant inmates."'231 Therefore, most LTSU inmates
are those who have consistently ignored previous incentives to modify
their behavior.232
The respondent posed the following question: "If the prospects of
having radios and televisions, weekly social visits, out of cell en-
counters with fellow prisoners, and the other inducements previously
catalogued were insufficient to catalyze change, how could [prison]
officials have reasonably entertained a view that withholding a news-
paper or a few photographs might succeed?" 233 There are many in-
centives for level 2 prisoners to improve their behavior,234 and, for
most inmates, many of the potential privileges that can be earned
through better behavior would likely have greater value to the prison-
ers than access to newspapers, magazines, and photographs.235 As a
result, depriving prisoners of their First Amendment right to these
particular materials was arbitrary. Consequently, the Court should
not have sustained the regulation, because it was not reasonably re-
lated to the interest of improving inmate behavior.
Furthermore, the regulation prohibiting access to newspapers,
magazines, and personal photographs is analogous to the marriage
regulation in Turner. There, the Court held that the regulation
preventing inmates from marrying was not reasonably related to
safety concerns. 236 The regulation was an "exaggerated response" to
the threat of "love triangles" and an attempt to promote self-reliance
among female inmates. 237 In addition to using common sense, the
Court looked to the record to search for evidence that the regulation
229. 399 F.3d 134, 141 (3d Cir. 2005), rev'd, Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006). About
25% of inmates graduated out of level 2. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2579 (plurality opinion). However,
there is no indication that this percentage would change in any way if the regulation restricting
access to newspapers, magazines, and photographs was eliminated.
230. See Brief for the Respondent at 22, Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006) (No. 04-1739).
231. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2576.
232. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 230, at 22.
233. Id. (emphasis omitted).
234. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2589-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
235. Additionally, over a two-and-a-half year period, only ten prisoners were transferred out
of LTSU, which is evidence that the prison's policy did little good at promoting good behavior.
See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 230, at 9.
236. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 97 (1987).
237. Id. at 97-99.
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was connected to the prison's asserted interests. 238 The record failed
to provide sufficient evidence of a connection, so the regulation was
overruled. 239
Similarly, the regulation prohibiting access to secular, nonlegal
newspapers and magazines and personal photographs cannot be justi-
fied on its face or by the record. Because of the nature of level 2
inmates and the many existing incentives to improve behavior, this
regulation, on its face, will do little or nothing to facilitate rehabilita-
tion.240 Also, like the marriage restriction, the record did not show
any evidence that prohibiting access to newspapers, magazines, and
photographs promotes improved behavior. 241
Finally, as noted in Justice Stevens's dissent, the marriage restric-
tion would have to be upheld under the plurality's reasoning in
Beard.242 If prohibiting access to newspapers, magazines, and photo-
graphs supposedly provided a legitimate incentive for graduation from
level 2, then the marriage regulation should have also been upheld,
because it provided an incentive for inmates to improve behavior to
be released early from prison so they can marry.243 However, the
Court rejected such tenuous reasoning in Turner; thus, Beard was in-
correct in following such reasoning. Like the marriage regulation, the
regulation in Beard was not reasonably related to a legitimate peno-
logical interest.
There are no other justifications for the regulation that are reasona-
bly related to a legitimate penological interest. Prison officials at-
tempted to assert two further justifications to which the Beard Court
did not respond. 244 The officials argued that the regulation reduced
the amount of prisoner property, which would provide two benefits:
(1) it would allow correction officers to more easily find hidden con-
238. Id. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, explained as follows:
We conclude that on this record, the Missouri prison regulation, as written, is not rea-
sonably related to these penological interests .... [P]etitioners have pointed to nothing
in the record suggesting that the marriage regulation was viewed as preventing such
entanglements....
Nor, on this record, is the marriage restriction reasonably related to the articulated
rehabilitation goal. . . . The rehabilitation concern appears from the record to have
been centered almost exclusively on female inmates marrying other inmates or felons
Id. at 97-99; see also Brief for Lumumba Kenyatta Incumaa as Amicus Curiae Supporting Re-
spondent at 9, Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006) (No. 04-1739).
239. Turner, 482 U.S. at 97-99.
240. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 230, at 22.
241. Banks v. Beard, 399 F.3d 134, 141 (3d Cir. 2005), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006).
242. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2588 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 2579 (plurality opinion).
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traband; and (2) it would make it more difficult for prisoners to use
the newspapers and magazines as weapons. 245 As Justice Stevens ar-
gued, these justifications are clearly unreasonable, because prisoners
are allowed to have a number of items in their cells, including relig-
ious newspapers and legal periodicals. 246 Allowing a prisoner to have
an additional newspaper or magazine would not have a measurable
negative effect on safety.247
B. The Regulation in Beard Cannot Be Properly Analyzed under
Turner's Second, Third, or Fourth Factors
Because the connection between the regulation and rehabilitation
is, at best, tenuous, Turner's other three factors become critical if the
regulation is to be upheld.248 However, regulations that attempt to
induce better prisoner behavior by restricting constitutional rights
cannot satisfy the other three Turner factors. As for Turner's second
factor, a regulation that attempts to induce good behavior by restrict-
ing a constitutional right does not, by definition, provide alternative
means to exercise that right.249 In fact, the very goal of the regulation
is to deprive the prisoners of the constitutional right.250 The regula-
tion in Beard would be undermined if the prisoners had another way
to exercise their right to newspapers, magazines, and personal photo-
graphs. 251 Nevertheless, while alternative means to exercise the right
do not need to be "ideal," they at least need to "be available. '2 52 The
regulation in Beard is problematic, because there are no alternative
means to acquire the political, cultural, scientific, and societal infor-
mation found in secular, nonlegal newspapers and magazines. 253
Other than limited legal and religious correspondence, this regulation
effectively cuts prisoners off from the outside world.254 Nor is there
any alternative to possessing a personal photograph, because a pris-
oner's loved ones may be unable to write letters or may be ineligible
to visit the inmate in prison.255
245. Id.
246. Id. at 2586-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 2586.
248. See Brief for the Prison Legal News et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at
27, Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006) (No. 04-1739).
249. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2584-85 (Thomas, J., concurring).
250. See Brief for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae in Support of the
Respondent at 13, Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006) (No. 04-1739).
251. Id. at 15.
252. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 135 (2003).
253. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 230, at 24.
254. See Brief for the Prison Legal News et al., supra note 248, at 27.
255. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 230, at 25-26.
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Furthermore, in response to Turner's third factor, allowing prison-
ers to exercise their right to newspapers, magazines, and personal
photographs will not have a negative "ripple effect" on other prison-
ers or prison resources. 256 Contrary to the Court's assertion, there is
no evidence that the regulation's absence will result in "worse" behav-
ior by level 2 inmates. 257 Also, allowing the inmates to have limited
access to newspapers and magazines would not be a significant hard-
ship on prison resources, because the regulation only involved about
forty level 2 inmates who were already permitted to have religious and
legal periodicals. 258
Finally, the regulation is incompatible with Turner's fourth factor,
which looks to whether there are easy alternatives to the regulation.25 9
The Court found that using an alternative to accommodate the right
would undermine the incentive of improving behavior.260 This is pre-
cisely why Justice Thomas believed that the fourth factor is not a use-
ful tool in determining whether to uphold this type of regulation.261
On the other hand, the penological goal was to make level 2 misera-
ble, so as to provide an incentive for level 2 inmates to behave better
as a means of graduating to a different unit.262 However, by graduat-
ing out of level 2, inmates would regain many privileges, including
more phone calls and visitors, contact with other inmates, use of edu-
cational programs, and access to television and radio.263 Thus, the pe-
nological objective of providing strong incentives for improved inmate
behavior exists without depriving prisoners of their First Amendment
right to newspapers, magazines, and photographs. 264 Thus, the regula-
tion was an "exaggerated response" to the interest in inmate rehabili-
tation. 265 The Court incorrectly found that the regulation met
Turner's four-part test. In fact, the regulation does not satisfy any of
the four parts. Therefore, the regulation, which prohibits access to
newspapers, magazines, and personal photographs, violated inmates'
First Amendment rights.
256. See id. at 26-27.
257. Compare Beard v. Banks. 126 S. Ct. at 2580 (plurality opinion), with Banks v. Beard. 399
F.3d 134, 141 (3d Cir. 2005).
258. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 230, at 27. In fact, it may have a small positive
effect on prison resources, because prison officials would no longer need to determine whether a
publication is religious, legal, or secular. See id.
259. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987).
260. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2580 (plurality opinion).
261. See id. at 2585 (Thomas. J., concurring).
262. See Brief for the Prison Legal News et al., supra note 248, at 29-30.
263. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2589 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
264. See Brief for the Prison Legal News et al., supra note 248, at 29.
265. See id.
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C. The Beard Decision Is Distinguishable from Pertinent
Legal Precedent
In addition to misapplying the Turner test, the Beard Court incor-
rectly applied relevant legal precedent in its analysis. Beard's facts are
distinguishable from those in past cases in which the Court upheld
prison regulations impinging upon First Amendment rights. 266
First, the regulation prohibiting access to newspapers, magazines,
and photographs is distinguishable from Bell v. Wolfish,267 in which
the Court upheld a regulation restricting prisoners from having
hardcover books that were not sent directly from a publisher or book-
store.268 Although Bell was decided before the pivotal Turner case,2 69
the Court still used a rational basis standard in its analysis. 270 The Bell
Court revealed that the regulation's content-neutral character influ-
enced its decision. 271 On the other hand, the regulation in Beard was
not content-neutral, because it only prohibited secular, nonlegal news-
papers and magazines.272 Therefore, the rule did not encompass
newspapers and magazines that prison officials determined to be relig-
ious or legal. 27 3 For example, officials allowed level 2 inmates access
to The Jewish Daily Forward but denied access to The Christian Sci-
ence Monitor.274 This was determined solely on the publications' con-
tents.275 Thus, whether an inmate would be allowed to have a
266. See, e.g., Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401
(1989); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
267. 441 U.S. 520.
268. Id. at 550.
269. The Court decided Turner in 1987 and Bell in 1979.
270. In Bell, the Court stated that the regulation was a "rational response ... to an obvious
security problem." 441 U.S. at 550.
271. Id. at 551.
272. Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2576 (2006) (plurality opinion).
273. Id. at 2593 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
274. Id. The Jewish Daily Forward is a weekly newspaper covering Jewish affairs. The Jewish
Daily Forward, Our History, http://www.forward.com/about/history/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
The Christian Science Monitor is published by The First Church of Christ, Scientist. It features
U.S. and international news, and it also includes one daily religious article. The Christian Sci-
ence Monitor, About the Monitor, http://www.csmonitor.com/aboutus/about the-monitor.html
(last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
275. This was irrational. For example, prisoners could read about the 2006 Israel-Lebanon
conflict in The Jewish Daily Forward. See, e.g., Vita Bekker, Two Deaths Bring Crisis Home to
U.S., THE JEWISH DAILY FORWARD, Aug. 11, 2006, available at http://www.forward.com/ articles/
two-deaths-bring-crisis-home-to-us; Ori Nir, Israeli Military Policy Under Fire After Qana At-
tack, THE JEWISH DAILY FORWARD, Aug. 4, 2006, available at http://www.forward.com/articles/
israeli-military-policy-under-fire-after-qana-atta. However, inmates could not read about the
war in Iraq in The Christian Science Monitor or any other "secular" newspaper. See Beard, 126
S. Ct. at 2593 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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newspaper or magazine was determined exclusively on whether the
publication's content was sufficiently "religious" or "legal. 276
The Bell Court's decision was also influenced by the fact that, even
if prisoners had somewhat limited access to hardcover books, they still
had other sources from which to acquire various reading materials,
including paperback books.277 In Beard, however, the level 2 inmates
could have religious and legal periodicals and one library book, but
were prohibited from accessing the vast amount of information found
in secular, nonlegal newspapers and magazines. 278 Finally, under the
regulation in Bell, the prisoners were subject to the book restriction
for a maximum of sixty days.279 In contrast, prisoners could poten-
tially be held in level 2 indefinitely-remaining subject to the
regulation. 280
Next, the Court used Turner's four-part test to uphold the regula-
tion in Thornburgh v. Abbott, allowing prison officials to deny prison-
ers access to individual publications that would be harmful to prison
security. 281 The regulation in Beard is distinguishable, because it pro-
hibited all secular, nonlegal newspapers and magazines,282 regardless
of any potential influence they may have on inmates' behavior. Addi-
tionally, unlike the regulation in Beard, the regulation in Thornburgh
still provided ample alternatives for prisoners to practice their First
Amendment rights by receiving publications that did not specifically
pose a threat to security.283 Thus, the Thornburgh regulation ad-
dressed particular, articulated security concerns connected with indi-
vidual periodicals. 28 4  In contrast, the Beard regulation broadly
prohibits all secular, nonlegal newspapers and magazines with the
mere hope that it might provide some incentive for better behavior. 285
Finally, the Court also used the Turner test to uphold a regulation in
Overton v. Bazzetta that prohibited inmates with substance abuse in-
fractions from having visitation privileges for two years.286 Again, this
276. Subsequently, in Turner, the Court confirmed that "it [is] important to inquire whether
prison regulations restricting inmates' First Amendment rights operated in a neutral fashion,
without regard to the content of the expression." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 90 (1987). The
Beard Court failed to value this point.
277. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 551 (1979).
278. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2586 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
279. 441 U.S. at 552.
280. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2590 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
281. 490 U.S. 401, 403-05 (1989).
282. 126 S. Ct. at 2576 (plurality opinion).
283. 490 U.S. at 418.
284. Id. at 415-17.
285. 126 S. Ct. at 2579 (plurality opinion).
286. 539 U.S. 126, 130-31 (2003).
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regulation is distinguishable from that in Beard. The regulation fo-
cused on the problem of drug smuggling and targeted specific inmates
with substance abuse infractions. 287 On the other hand, the regulation
at issue in Beard broadly applied to all level 2 inmates, regardless of
whether they had any previous problems associated with newspapers,
magazines, or photographs.288 Additionally, the visitation restriction
could be lifted after two years,289 whereas prisoners in level 2 could
potentially be subject to the ban on newspapers, magazines, and pho-
tographs indefinitely. 290 Thus, the regulation in Beard may act as a
"de facto permanent ban"-the type of restriction that the Overton
Court indicated may be unconstitutional. 291 Furthermore, prisoners
subject to the visitation restriction had alternative means of communi-
cating with friends and family, such as through letters and phone
calls. 292 The level 2 prisoners, however, did not have any realistic
means of obtaining news or current events. 293
Although the Court upheld the prison regulations in Bell, Thorn-
burgh, and Overton, the regulations at issue were less restrictive of
constitutional rights than the regulation in Beard. In those cases, the
Court warned that a more restrictive regulation may be unconstitu-
tional. 294 Accordingly, the Court should not have upheld the regula-
tion impinging upon prisoners' First Amendment right to newspapers,
magazines, and personal photographs.
D. The Court Should Have Adopted a Standard that Did Not
Further Extend the Deference Given to Prison Officials
Although the Court traditionally has given a great amount of defer-
ence to prison officials when examining prison regulations,295 com-
plete deference is inappropriate. The Court gave nearly complete
287. Id. at 129-30.
288. 126 S. Ct. at 2576 (plurality opinion).
289. Overton, 539 U.S. at 130.
290. Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2590 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
291. Overton, 539 U.S. at 134.
292. Id. at 135.
293. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 230, at 24-25. "The time when letters served as
a primary means of communicating political and other public developments expired long ago."
Id. at 24. Additionally, "it is absurd to contend that letters, chaplains, attorneys or family visits
can function as suitable surrogates for periodicals." Id. at 25.
294. See, e.g., Overton, 539 U.S. at 134-35 ("And if faced with evidence that [the] regulation is
treated as a de facto permanent ban on all visitation for certain inmates, we might reach a differ-
ent conclusion . . . . Alternatives to visitation need not be ideal, however; they need only be
available.").
295. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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deference to the prison officials in Beard and upheld the regulation
despite its unreasonableness.2 96
Courts must make sure that the constitutional rights of prisoners
are properly protected. Justice Brennan, dissenting in O'Lone v.
Shabazz, warned that, "[i]f a directive that officials act 'reasonably'
were deemed sufficient to check all exercises of power, the Constitu-
tion would hardly be necessary. Yet the Court deems this single stan-
dard adequate to restrain any type of conduct in which prison officials
might engage. '297 Justice Brennan suggested that a better and more
balanced approach to analyzing cases concerning the constitutional
rights of prisoners was offered by the Second Circuit in Abdul Wali v.
Coughlin.298
In Abdul Wali, the court determined that the level of deference ac-
corded to prison officials should depend upon "the nature of the right
being asserted, the type of activity in which they seek to engage, and
whether the challenged restriction works a total deprivation.., on the
exercise of that right. ' 299 The court suggested that, when a right is
"inherently inconsistent" with the nature of imprisonment, courts
should give nearly absolute deference to the prison officials' judg-
ment.300 Additionally, if exercising a right would be "presumptively
dangerous," the court should give "extremely broad, though not cate-
gorical" deference to views of prison officials. 30 1 Similar deference
should be given if there are many alternative means for the prisoners
to exercise a restricted right. 30 2 However, if "the activity in which
prisoners seek to engage is not presumptively dangerous, and where
official action (or inaction) works to deprive rather than merely limit
the means of exercising a protected right, professional judgment must
occasionally yield to constitutional mandate. ' 30 3 Thus, in this circum-
stance, prison officials would have to meet a higher level of scrutiny in
order for the regulation to be upheld. 30 4
Under this framework, the prison officials in Beard would have
needed to meet a higher level of scrutiny, because allowing prisoners
296. See supra notes 224-247 and accompanying text.
297. 482 U.S. 342, 356 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
298. Id. at 358 (citing Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015, 1033 (2d Cir. 1985)).
299. 754 F.2d at 1033.
300. Id. By "inherently inconsistent," the court refers to rights that are nonexistent inside
prison walls. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Prison officials would have to show that the regulation was "necessary to further an im-
portant governmental interest, and that the limitations on freedoms occasioned by the restriction
are no greater than necessary to effectuate the governmental objective involved." Id.
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to have access to newspapers, magazines, and personal photographs
was not presumptively dangerous, and the regulation specifically
sought to deprive inmates of their First Amendment right to those
materials. 30 5 Because there was no evidence that the regulation had
any influence on rehabilitation, 30 6 the prison officials would likely
have been unable to show that restricting access to newspapers,
magazines, and personal photographs was necessary to improve in-
mate behavior.
Justice Brennan explained that "prison officials are in control of the
evidence that is essential to establish the superiority of such depriva-
tion over other alternatives," and so it is "fair for these officials to be
held to a stringent standard of review in such extreme cases. ' 307 By
giving less deference to prison officials under the Abdul Wali ap-
proach, the Beard Court should have found that the deprivation of
First Amendment rights was unconstitutional.
Furthermore, while the Court has used the Turner test to analyze
other prison regulations encroaching upon inmates' rights,308 it made
a narrow exception in Johnson v. California, refusing to use it for
prison rules involving racial classifications. 309 However, if the Court
used the Abdul Wali framework instead of the Turner test for all cases
analyzing prison regulations impinging upon constitutional rights, the
Johnson decision would not have been an exception to the analysis
typical of these types of cases. In Johnson, the Court refused to use
the Turner test to analyze the racially segregated housing practice. 310
If the Abdul Wali framework would have been used, the Court still
should have concluded that the segregation rule was unconstitutional.
Assigning two inmates of different races to live in a single prison cell
was not presumptively dangerous. 311 Additionally, segregating in-
mates based on race violated society's interest in preventing govern-
ment-imposed racial classifications. 312 Thus, under the Abdul Wali
framework, the segregation rule would still need to be analyzed under
305. See Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2589 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
306. See Banks v. Beard, 399 F.3d 134, 141 (3d Cir. 2005), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006); Brief
for the Respondent, supra note 230, at 22.
307. O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 359 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
308. See, e.g., Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401
(1989); O'Lone, 482 U.S. 342.
309. 543 U.S. 499, 513 (2005).
310. Id.
311. Prison officials asserted that there was violence between racial gangs. Id. at 502-03.
However, this does not mean that housing individuals of different races with one another was
presumptively dangerous.
312. See id. at 505.
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a higher level of scrutiny, 313 but this analysis would be consistent with
other cases examining regulations that impinge upon inmates' consti-
tutional rights.
The framework in Abdul Wali offers a better approach to analyzing
cases concerning the constitutional rights of prisoners, because it al-
lows for the level of deference given to the prison officials to differ
based on factual circumstances. However, the Court has applied the
Turner test, giving nearly complete deference to prison officials. Un-
like the Abdul Wali framework, the Turner test is incompatible with
some types of prison regulations, such as the regulations in Beard and
Johnson.
V. IMPACT
The great deference afforded to prison officials in Beard may result
in severe negative consequences not only for prisoners, but for society
as a whole. For example, the extreme deference given to prison offi-
cials may allow for discrimination against prisoners based on their re-
ligion. 314 Additionally, prison officials will be able to point to Beard
to justify nearly any prison regulation impinging upon constitutional
rights. 315  Finally, the regulation may actually inhibit inmate
rehabilitation. 316
First, prison employees could discreetly discriminate against in-
mates based upon religion. Prisoners retain religious freedoms, and
prison officials may not discriminate against prisoners because of their
religion.317 Under the regulation at issue in Beard, a prison official
determines whether a publication qualifies as "religious. ' 31 8 Prison
officials might consciously or unconsciously favor or disfavor certain
religions when making this determination. Alternatively, a prison of-
ficial might attempt to punish a minority religious group by using har-
sher standards when deciding whether a requested newspaper or
magazine is religious. Thus, by upholding the regulation, the Court
inevitably gives prison officials room to engage in discriminatory and
abusive behavior toward prisoners based upon religion.
313. See Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015. 1033 (2d Cir. 1985). This would be consistent
with the Johnson Court's conclusion, and with previous cases that have held that strict scrutiny
must be used when analyzing racial classifications. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 227 (1995) ("[A]II racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.").
314. See infra notes 317-318 and accompanying text.
315. See infra notes 319-325 and accompanying text.
316. See infra notes 326-333 and accompanying text.
317. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319. 322 (1972).
318. Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572. 2593 (2006) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Furthermore, prison officials will be able to use the precedent es-
tablished in Beard "to justify virtually any prison regulation that does
not involve physical abuse. '319 In Beard, the Court concluded that, by
taking away the right to newspapers, magazines, and personal photo-
graphs, inmates would have an incentive to improve their behavior so
that they could regain those rights.320 Applying this reasoning, prison
officials could deprive prisoners of nearly any constitutional right 321
and could justify this deprivation on the basis that they are providing
inmates with an incentive to behave better.322 There is no apparent
limit to this justification. 323 The more fundamental the constitutional
right, the more leverage officials would gain over prisoners by restrict-
ing that right.324 In other words, "the more severe the restriction, the
more likely it will deter. ' '325 Thus, the nearly complete deference that
the Court gave prison officials poses a great threat to prisoners' con-
stitutional rights.
Finally, prohibiting inmate access to secular, nonlegal newspapers
and magazines may hurt rehabilitation efforts. 326 The Third Circuit
noted several cases suggesting that cutting prisoners off from the
outside world hinders rehabilitation. 327 For example, a court found
that rehabilitation is "furthered by efforts to inform and educate in-
mates, and foster their involvement in the world outside the prison
gates. '328 Another court noted that "deprivation of reading materials
in segregation can cause 'psychological deterioration' which in turn
can cause inmates either to be 'very withdrawn and curl up in infancy,
or [to] become acting out and aggressive people."' 329 The Beard
Court disregarded these cases, distinguishing them, because they did
not deal with "especially difficult prisoners" like those in level 2.330
319. Id. at 2592.
320. Id. at 2579 (plurality opinion).
321. This would exclude racial classifications. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
322. See Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2588 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[The deprivation theory of reha-
bilitation] would provide a 'rational basis' for any regulation that deprives a prisoner of a consti-
tutional right so long as there is at least a theoretical possibility that the prisoner can regain the
right at some future time by modifying his behavior."); Brief for Religious Liberty, supra note
250, at 8.
323. See Brief for the ACLU et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 9, Beard v.
Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006) (No. 04-1739).
324. Id. at 9.
325. Id. at 8.
326. Id. at 18.
327. Banks v. Beard, 399 F.3d 134, 142 n.9 (3d Cir. 2005), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006).
328. Id. (quoting Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015, 1034 (2d Cir. 1985)).
329. Id. (quoting Spellman v. Hopper, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1281 (M.D. Ala. 1999)).
330. 126 S. Ct. at 2581 (plurality opinion).
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However, in reality, this minor distinguishing point does not mean
that the prison regulation will not hamper rehabilitation.
A number of studies suggest that harsh prison restrictions, such as
the regulation at issue in Beard, will harm, rather than aid, rehabilita-
tion. In one study, researchers concluded that "harsher prison condi-
tions do not reduce post-release criminal behavior, and may even
increase it.''331 Other researchers have found that isolated prisoners
develop symptoms that include anxiety, confusion, hallucination, and
violent or self-destructive outbursts.332 These studies make sense:
isolating prisoners from the world and current events will make post-
release transition into the community more difficult and stressful,
which may lead to recidivism. Because most prisoners will eventually
return to the community, 333 this should be a great concern to the
courts and the American public.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Beard v. Banks, the Court gave great deference to prison officials
when it upheld a regulation impinging upon level 2 inmates' rights to
newspapers, magazines, and personal photographs. The extent of the
Court's deference was improper, and the regulation incorrectly de-
prived inmates of their First Amendments rights. Specifically, the
Court failed to properly apply the Turner test, as the regulation does
not satisfy any of the test's four parts. Additionally, the regulation in
Beard is distinguishable from pertinent legal precedent. Not only do
the precedential cases have distinguishable facts, but the regulations
at issue were generally less restrictive of constitutional rights than the
Beard regulation. Moreover, the Court failed to seize the opportunity
to adopt Justice Brennan's recommended test for analyzing depriva-
tions of prisoners' constitutional rights, which would be more practical
and workable than the Turner test. Now, lower courts are bound to
look to the faulty reasoning in Beard when analyzing challenges to
prison regulations that infringe upon inmates' constitutional rights.
In light of Beard, prisoners will be denied, without adequate justifi-
cation, their First Amendment right to have access to newspapers,
magazines, and personal photographs. This may hurt prisoners and
their likelihood of rehabilitation, which will consequently have a nega-
331. M. Keith Chen & Jesse M. Shapiro, Do Harsher Prison Conditions Reduce Recidivism?
A Discontinuity-Based Approach, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 19 (2007).
332. See JOHN J. GIBBONS & NICHOLAS DE B. KATZENBACH, CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT:
A REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON SAFETY AND ABUSE IN AMERICA'S PRISONS 58 (2006), avail-
able at http://www.prisoncommission.org/pdfs/ConfrontingConfinement.pdf.
333. In fact, 95% of inmates will return to the community. Id. at 11.
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tive impact on society as a whole. A former Minnesota warden ac-
knowledged this impact:
There are offenders who need to be highly controlled at all times...
[b]ut they still need contact with other people. They still need a
reason to approach each day with a positive attitude-a phone call
or visit from a loved one, a magazine or newspaper. They still need
to feel like human beings. 334
Unfortunately, the Court threw away the key.
Mary C. Meixner*
334. Id. at 57 (emphasis added).
* J.D. expected 2008, DePaul University College of Law; B.S. 2005, Loyola University Chi-
cago. Thanks to my dad, Vernon Meixner, and my mom, Eunice Meixner, for their loving
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